In all peace negotiations, there are thrusts, parries and counter-moves long before the opposing parties take to the table.
Even as a plane carrying US negotiator Steve Witkoff to Moscow was in the air, it was reported that a list of demands had been issued by the Kremlin.
Ukraine must not be allowed to join Nato.
The international community must recognise Russia’s capture of Crimea and the Ukrainian provinces of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk.
There must be no foreign peacekeeping troops inside Ukraine once a deal is struck.
While the first demand has already been broadly accepted by the international community – though not by Ukraine, the latter two clearly push beyond the West’s defensive positions.
It is no accident that Vladimir Putin appeared on the front lines on Wednesday for only the second time since the war began – and, for the first time, in combat fatigues. The negotiations, he is signalling, will not only be held in the Kremlin.
Vladimir Putin visits a command point for Russian troops involved in the counter-offensive in the Kursk region – Getty Images
If indeed a letter has been passed to Washington laying out the maximal demands above, the second track of the negotiations will play out on the battlefield: the longer Russia stalls on a 30-day ceasefire, the more chance it has of totally recapturing the western region of Kursk, thus depriving Ukraine of one of its trade-able cards, not to mention morale.
Mr Witkoff, Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, the president’s key negotiators, want a deal fast. They keep saying so. It is transparently in Russia’s interest to slow the process down, even for this 30-day confidence-building truce. Perhaps, then, the hurried negotiators – whipped by Donald Trump in the White House – might consider concessions.
Ukraine joining Nato
Volodymyr Zelensky has offered to step down if that means Ukraine is granted access to Nato. But Russia has repeatedly stated that Ukraine joining Nato is a red line, blaming the alliance’s expansion in eastern Europe for its invasion nearly three years ago.
In terms of the Russian demands gradually taking shape, Nato membership is the milksop. As soon as Pete Hegseth ruled out Ukraine joining the alliance last month, any hope that Kyiv could be snapped into Nato upon the signing of a deal – thus availing itself of Article 5 protections – vanished.
Some analysts argue it should be put back on the table, including Stephen Hadley, George W Bush’s former national security advisor, in a recent article in Foreign Affairs. But European Nato leaders are now more concerned with whether the Trump administration would fulfil its Article 5 obligations if they are attacked themselves. This could be a straightforward concession to Russia.
Russia’s occupied territories
International recognition of Russia’s occupied territories raises the stakes considerably. Ukraine will object, and hard. Europe, likewise, has no interest in rubber-stamping a Russian invasion (a poor example to set for Transnistria or, worse, the Suwalki Gap).
But it is US negotiators at the table, and, with the change-over in the White House, their intentions on the matter are not so clear. Mr Trump’s predominant interest in Ukraine appears, at times, to be its mineral wealth. The bulk of such resources lies in the Donbas region, part occupied by Russian forces.
Putin last month said he was ready to work with Mr Trump on joint mining projects in what he called “Novorossiya” – the Russian term for the territories seized from Ukraine. America could hardly be seen to collaborate on mining projects with Putin in illegally seized lands, but recognising Moscow’s claim to the territory might change the picture.
Peacekeeping force
One of the more curious elements of the pitch-rolling ahead of negotiations is Mr Trump’s assertion that Putin agreed to the deployment of European peacekeepers when they spoke on the phone. Every sign coming out of the Kremlin, in public, suggests otherwise.
Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister, regularly slams the idea. A leaked Feb 25 document from a think tank close to the FSB (Federal Security Service) similarly casts it aside. Instead, Russia should demand a buffer zone on the border, and a totally demilitarised zone around Crimea and in southern Ukraine near Odesa.
According to a Bloomberg report last week, Putin could make any support for peace conditional on him being able to choose the international make-up of a peacekeeping force. There might be room for negotiation here.
The Quincy Institute, a Washington-based think tank, recently suggested staffing the buffer zone on the border with soldiers from the Global South. Putin has made great efforts to win support from such nations as he faces diplomatic isolation elsewhere: their presence on Russia’s borders could discourage too much lethal mischief-making.
Ukraine, clearly, will demand the vastly greater security that would be provided by a European force, including British and French troops. Early indications suggest that Sir Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron are working on a “reassurance force” that would be based in cities away from the front line, near key energy and infrastructure sites.
Putin’s peacekeeper position could well be that familiar negotiating tactic: a maximalist demand, thrown out in order to be later “ceded” as a “concession” to the other side. The real goal – and the hard line – will be cementing the status of “Novorossiya”, the fruit of a war that has cost Russia so many tens of thousands of lives.
